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Learning fear via the experience of contingencies between a conditioned stimulus (CS) and an aversive unconditioned stimulus (US) is
often assumed to be fundamentally different from learning fear via instructions. An open question is whether fear-related brain areas
respond differently to experienced CS–US contingencies than tomerely instructed CS–US contingencies. Here, we contrasted two exper-
imental conditionswhere subjectswere instructed to expect the sameCS–UScontingencieswhile onlyone conditionwas characterizedby
prior experience with the CS–US contingency. Using multivoxel pattern analysis of fMRI data, we found CS-related neural activation
patterns in the right amygdala (but not in other fear-related regions) that dissociated between whether a CS–US contingency had been
instructed and experienced versus merely instructed. A second experiment further corroborated this finding by showing a category-
independent neural response to instructed and experienced, but not merely instructed, CS presentations in the human right amygdala.
Together, these findings are in line with previous studies showing that verbal fear instructions have a strong impact on both brain and
behavior. However, even in the face of fear instructions, the human right amygdala still shows a separable neural pattern response to
experience-based fear contingencies.
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Introduction
As a product of evolution, animals are equipped with the ability
to learn relations that affect their survival. For example, by recogniz-
ing contingencies between certain stimuli in the environment [con-
ditioned stimuli (CSs)] and harmful events [unconditioned stimuli
(USs)], animals can learn to anticipate these events in the future,
a process thought to underlie Pavlovian fear conditioning (Pav-
lov, 1927;Maren, 2001). Pavlovian learning is often distinguished
from other forms of fear acquisition (e.g., via instructions or
observation; Olsson and Phelps, 2007) as it necessitates first-
hand experiences of paired events rather than information trans-
fer from an instructor or model. The experience-based nature
and strong evolutionary conservation of Pavlovian conditioning
ledmany theorists to think that conditioning in humans happens
relatively automatically and independently from verbal process-
ing or even awareness (Mineka and Ohman, 2002; Dolan and
Vuilleumier, 2003; Olsson and Phelps, 2004; Grillon, 2009;
Schultz and Helmstetter, 2010; LeDoux, 2014). Accordingly, it
has been proposed that there is an evolutionary old fear module
in the human brain, centered around the amygdala, that con-
tributes to the acquisition and expression of Pavlovian fear by
specifically mediating its putative nonverbal, experience-based
element (Ohman and Mineka, 2001). Specifically, this theory
postulates the amygdala-centered fear module to be “encapsu-
lated,” i.e., impenetrable to conscious cognitive control (Ohman
and Mineka, 2001).
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Significance Statement
In our study, we addressed a fundamental problem of the science of human fear learning and memory, namely whether fear
learning via experience in humans relies on a neural pathway that can be separated from fear learning via verbal information.
Using two new procedures and recent advances in the analysis of brain imaging data, we localized purely experience-based fear
processing and memory in the right amygdala, thereby making a direct link between human and animal research.
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If there is abrainmodule responsible forpurely experience-based
Pavlovian fear learning, it must operate relatively independently
fromverballymediatedor instructed fear learning.Therefore, to test
whether Pavlovian fear learning can operate independently from
verbally mediated fear learning, previous studies tried to isolate
neural correlates of Pavlovian learning by finding evidence of
conditioning in the absence ofCS awareness, that is, with backward-
masked or subliminally presented CSs. These studies often
pointed toward the amygdala (Morris et al., 1998; Critchley et al.,
2002; Knight et al., 2009; Tabbert et al., 2011) as the neural sub-
strate of Pavlovian fear learning, but also received substantial
criticism based on methodological (potential residual CS aware-
ness; Mitchell et al., 2009) and statistical (Vadillo et al., 2016)
grounds. Even evidence for fear conditioning in nonverbal hu-
man children (Watson and Rayner, 1920) still leaves open the
main question that motivated our research: once a human be-
comes verbal, can these verbal processes override learning path-
ways via experience, or do we keep separable pathways for
experience-based fear conditioning instead? In other words, it
remains unclear whether the human brain reserves space for the
unique impact of actually experiencing CS–US pairings, in the
face of explicit fear instructions.
If we want to demonstrate a truly independent, separable
neural response to experience-based Pavlovian conditioning, we
must contrast it to verbally mediated instruction-based learning.
Therefore, rather than trying to exclude conscious or language-
based processing, as in previous studies, we here developed an
experiment where conditions were optimal for verbally mediated
language-based processing to override the hypothesized separate
experience-based component to fear learning. To this end, we
compared neural pattern responses to two CSs. While both were
part of explicitly instructed contingencies, one was [CS Paired
(CSP)] and the other was not [CS Unpaired (CSU)] previ-
ously paired with the US (Raes et al., 2014; Mertens et al., 2016).
Hence, whereas both stimuli were expected to activate the same
instruction-based fear memory during the memory-testing
phase, only the previously paired CS (CSP) should additionally
activate experience-based memory elements, which we here call
the Pavlovian trace. This way, we studied a unique, experience-
based component of Pavlovian fear conditioning in humans. In a
second experiment, we aimed to replicate and further extend this
finding by testing whether a similar neural signature could be
observed when comparing entirely novel (i.e., merely instructed)
to old (i.e., instructed and experienced) CS presentations.
Materials andMethods
General method
In our first and main experiment, participants were first instructed that
two visual stimuli (CSP, CSU) could be followed by a painful elec-
trotactile stimulus (US). A third stimulus (CS) was introduced as a
control stimulus that would never be paired with the US. Participants
were then told that, in a preparatory training phase, only one of the two
CSs (CSP) would be occasionally paired with an electrical stimulus,
whereas the other CS (CSU) would be occasionally followed by a
placeholder (drawing of a lightning bolt), under the false pretense that
this limitation of the absolute number of electrical stimulations given
would allow the subjects to gradually adjust to the aversive task condi-
tions. During this training phase, we randomly presented each CS nine
times; three of nine CSP presentations were followed by a US, making
subjects experience the CSP–US contingency, while three of nine
CSUpresentationswere followed by the placeholder (Fig. 1). Before the
subsequent test phase, participants were reinstructed that, from then on,
both CSs could be followed by a US. In fact, no more USs were deliv-
ered, keeping this critical phase of the experiment free of any Pavlovian
fear learning. Because instructions in the test phase were identical for
both CSs, neural activity patterns associated exclusively with the CSP
during the test phase would reflect a Pavlovian trace of actual CS–US
pairings. This procedure has been tested before by Raes and colleagues
(2014) and Mertens and colleagues (2016) but without simultaneous
MRI recordings. Therefore, the behavioral data discussed here are com-
pared with data from those studies.
A second experiment was performed to examine whether our main
finding could also be observed in a different, but conceptually similar
procedure. As an additional motivation, this second experiment also
allowed us to examine whether a higher visual category-independent
neural response to instructed and experienced CS presentations could be
observed, compared with merely instructed CS presentations. This ex-
periment was different in design from Experiment 1, but nonetheless
allowed for a similar comparison between instructed and experienced
versus merely instructed fear. Specifically, we used a broad range of dif-
ferent CSs (house or face pictures), and participants were instructed on
the relevant CS–US contingencies before each CS presentation (see Fig.
8A). That is, each trial of this experiment started with the presentation of
an instruction screen that defined the CS and the CS, followed by the
presentation of the CS or CS. Each CS was in its turn followed by a
US presentation. This way, participants sawmany different CS instructions.
Importantly, however, whereas some contingency instructions (and the ex-
perience thereof) recurred multiple times throughout the experiment
(i.e., old CS stimuli), others were always new (i.e., new CS stimuli).
Hence, some contingencies had been “instructed and experienced,”
whereas, for new CSs, this was not the case. The new CSs could therefore
be considered “merely instructed.”
In contrast to Experiment 1, Experiment 2 also allowed for a compar-
ison within CS conditions but across visual stimuli or visual categories.
Specifically, the different CS instructions could be further subdivided
into those that used pictures of faces as CSs, and those that used pictures
of houses as CSs. This way, we could compute the similarity in neural
activation patterns at the time of CS presentation between faces versus
houses separately (see Fig. 8B) for each of the four different CS presen-
tation conditions: CSold, CSold, CSnew, andCSnew. By comput-
ing similarities between responses to faces and houses, this study allowed
us to investigate to which extent fear-related regions showed a neural
response independent from CS object category, and thus specific to
whether a CS carried a representation of threat (CS vs CS) or whether
it was old or novel (CSold vs CSnew). Following up on the findings of the
first experiment, we zoomed in on the pattern similarities in the left and
right amygdala. We were especially interested in whether the right
amygdala would show a higher similarity between face-evoked and
house-evoked patterns when a CS was old, which would indicate a
representation of threat sensitive to whether a contingency had been
experienced before.
Participants
Twenty participants took part in Experiment 1 (12 women and eight
men; mean age, 24 years; SD, 2.5 years; range, 19–28 years), and another
20 in Experiment 2. One participant from Experiment 2 was excluded
from analyses due to self-reported nausea and inattention to the task, so
the final sample of Experiment 2 contained 19 participants (10 women
and nine men; mean age, 24 years; SD, 3.7 years; range, 18–34 years). All
participants had normal or corrected-to-normal vision, and were right-
handed as assessed by the Edinburgh Handedness Inventory. They gave
their informed written consent and reported no current or past neuro-
logical, psychiatric, or major medical disorder. Every participant was
paid €35 for participating. The work has been completed with the ap-
proval of the Ghent University Hospital Ethical Committee.
Stimuli and procedure: Experiment 1
Stimuli. The conditioned stimuli consisted of three dissociable blue frac-
tal figures (snowflakes) presented on a white background. Counterbal-
anced across participants, one of the fractals served as a CS that would
never be followed by an electrotactile pain stimulus (CS), another
served as a CS that could occasionally be followed by a pain stimulus
(CSP), and a third as a CS that subjects were told could be followed by
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a pain stimulus, but was actually only occasionally followed by a place-
holder (CSU). The electrotactile pain stimulus that served as the aver-
sive stimulus (US) consisted of a train of 12 square-wave pulses of 2 ms
duration each (interval, 18 ms). The US was delivered through a surface
electrode with a platinum pin (Specialty Developments) onto the right
leg over the retromalleolar course of the sural nerve using aDS5 electrical
stimulator (Digitimer). The intensitywas determined through a standard
work-up procedure before the experiment (see below). The placeholder
consisted of a centrally presented yellow drawing of a lightning bolt.
Ratings. Self-reported CS fear and US expectancy were assessed for all
CSs in separate rating blocks interspersed between conditioning trials.
These ratings were performed on screen. On a typical rating trial, the CS
was presented centrally, while the question on fear or US expectancy was
situated on top of the CS and a rating scale was presented below. Before
each rating phase, participants were instructed to respond to the ques-
tions that would appear at the top of the screen by selecting the response
possibility that felt most appropriate to them. Furthermore, it was
stressed that these questions pertained to their most recent encounter
with the CSs during the foregoing (conditioning) phase. In addition,
participants were given the following instructions: “Whenever you are
asked about your expectancy of an electrical stimulus, we refer to the
actual stimulation, not to the picture of the lightning bolt.” The questions
that appeared were as follows: “Howmuch fear did you experience when
looking at this figure?” (self-reported CS fear) and “To what extent did
Figure 1. Procedure Experiment 1 and behavioral results. A, Experiment trials and rating screens. Each trial startedwith the presentation of a fixation cross, followed by the presentation of a CS.
In the training phase, the CSP was occasionally followed by a US (electrical stimulation) and the CSU by a US placeholder (picture of a lightning bolt). The CSwas never followed by either a
US or placeholder. In the test phase, none of the CSs was followed by a US or placeholder. Rating screens assessed participant’s fear experience and US expectancy associated with each of the CSs.
B, Experimental procedure and instructions. Before training, subjects were instructed that only the CSP could be followed by the US, while the CSU could only be followed by the placeholder.
Before testing, subjects were told to expect USs after both CSs. Both phases consisted of threeminiblocks (where every CS was randomly presented three times), each followed by a rating block.
Three of nine CS presentations were followed by either the US or the US placeholder. C, Mean fear ratings. D, Mean US expectancy ratings. The error bars are1 SEM. tr, Training; te, test.
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you expect an electrical stimulation while looking at this figure?” (US
expectancy). Participants responded verbally on a nine-point Likert
scale. Numbers 1, 3, 5, 7, and 9 of this scale carried a response label
presented right above the number (1, none at all/certainly not; 3, very
little/rather not; 5, uncertain; 7, somewhat/to some extent; 9, verymuch/
most certainly).
Procedure. The experimenter attached the electrodes to the partici-
pant, who was positioned on the scanner table, just before the table was
inserted into the scanner. Next, the tolerance level of the pain stimulus
was determined for each participant individually bymeans of an adapted
interleaved staircase procedure. This procedure consisted of 20 trials
where USs were presented and participants rated the subjectively expe-
rienced pain intensity on a scale from zero (not painful at all) to 10
(extremely painful). To increase reliability of the threshold procedure,
the 20 trials were divided into two separate sequences of 10 trials differing
in current amplitude on their first trial, which was randomly drawn from
either 0.5–1.0 mA or 1.0–1.5 mA, respectively. After the first trial of each
sequence, the current amplitude of the following trial depended on the
participant’s rating in the previous trial of the respective sequence. If the
rating was 5, current amplitude would increase by 0.1 mA in the fol-
lowing trial of that sequence, whereas it would decrease by 0.1mA in case
of a rating 5, or stay the same if the rating equaled five. Thus, ratings
from both sequences would approach five on the rating scale for each
participant. The two sequences were presented intermixed and the final
electrical current amplitude was then calculated as the mean of the final
values from both sequences. Participants were instructed to rate an in-
tensity five when it was experienced as unpleasant, but not intolerable,
andwere informed that the pain stimuli used throughout the experiment
would not surpass this value.
After this preparation phase, the participants were instructed to wait
for 5 min, during which an anatomical scan would be administered.
Upon completion of the anatomical scan, the participantswere presented
with the instructions. Participants were informed that three fractal fig-
ures (Fig. 1A) would appear successively for 8 s each. Following the
presentation of all three fractals on a white background, the participants
were instructed that two of the fractals would sometimes be followed by
an electrical stimulation, whereas the third fractal would never (in capital
letters) be followed by an electrical stimulation. Subsequently, partici-
pants were informed that these fractal-pain contingencies would be
clearly displayed and were encouraged to closely attend to these con-
tingencies. After this instruction, a slide containing both CS fractals
and the text “ electrical stimulation!” was presented over 8 s. This
was followed by another 8 s presentation of a slide containing the CS
fractal and the following text: “This figure will never be followed by a
stimulation.”
Following these general instructions, the participants were informed
that they would first be allowed to familiarize themselves with the stimuli
and the procedure in an initial training phase. The training phase was
said to be very similar to the test phase that would follow, except that
some of the electrical stimulations would be replaced by a picture of a
lightning bolt (i.e., the placeholder stimulus; Fig. 1A). Participants were
told that this was to prevent them from getting too many pain stimuli
before the real experiment actually started. They were asked to keep in
mind that whenever a lightning bolt was presented in the actual test
phase, a real electrical stimulation would occur. This was followed by a
slide presenting the CSP (with electrical stimulation) and CSU (with
lightning bolt) contingencies over 8 s. The final page of instructions
informed participants that they would be asked to perform fear and US
expectancy ratings at regular intervals during the upcoming phase. They
were told that no stimuli would be administered during the ratings and
asked to remember the most recent encounter with the fractals while
answering the questions.
The actual training phase consisted of 27 conditioning trials (nine for
each CS) interspersed with blocked ratings. Each conditioning trial
started with a 4 s presentation of a fixation cross followed by a CS pre-
sentation for 8 s, with an intertrial interval of 13, 15, or 17 s (Fig. 1A). On
reinforced trials, the US or placeholder was presented at CS offset. The
US was presented for 300 ms. The placeholder remained on screen for
500ms. The CSs were presented in “triplets” of three CS presentations so
that each CS type was presented once before the next triplet started. Trial
order was randomized within triplets. Blocked ratings of fear and US
expectancy were presented after 9, 18, and 27 conditioning trials (3, 6,
and 9 triplets) respectively. As such, threeminiblockswere createdwithin
the training phase, each containing three trials of CSP,CSU, andCS
presentations. Three of nine CSP and CSU presentations were rein-
forced during the training phase. For half the participants, the first, third,
and penultimate presentation of the CSP was followed by the US and
the first, second, and last presentation of the CSU was followed by the
placeholder. The other half of the participants had counterbalanced re-
inforcement schedules (e.g., the first, second, and last presentation of the
CSP would be followed by the US).
Each block of ratings contained six ratings (two for each CS). The
order of rating trials within each rating block was fully randomized.
However, due to technical difficulties, the CS presentation and question
type were independently randomized within each rating block for the
first five participants, resulting in repeated measurements or empty cells
for someof the questions. For this reason, the rating analyses are reported
for the last 15 subjects only. Brain–behavior correlation analyses, how-
ever, which focus on averaged CS ratings for an entire phase (across the
three rating blocks), were possible to perform on the entire set of
participants. Before the start of each rating block, it was stressed that by
electrical stimulation (expectancy), we referred solely to real electrical
stimulations (i.e., not placeholders).
After the training phase, participants again received on-screen instruc-
tions. They were informed that now the test phase would start, meaning
that all electrical stimulations would be presented for real and no place-
holders would be used. Participants were instructed that the test phase
would evolve similarly to the training phase in all other respects. The
course of the test phase was very similar to that of the test phase, with 27
trials and three rating blocks in between. However, no USs or placehold-
ers were presented during this phase.
Stimuli and procedure: Experiment 2
Stimuli. The stimuli for Experiment 2 were gray-scaled images selected
from a database of 252 images of faces and 252 images of houses as
previously used byMuhle-Karbe and colleagues (2017). For each subject
separately, 128 pictures (64 from each category) were randomly selected
and assigned to 64 pairs of pictures with the only restriction that both
pictures should be from the same category. When the category was faces,
we further assured participants that both pictures were from the same
gender (and an equal number of pairs were formed per gender), to avoid
the possibility that participants would dissociate the pictures based on
gender. Per pair, one picture served as a CS that would never be followed
by an electrical stimulation (CS), while another served as a CS that
would always be followed by an electrical stimulation (CS).While eight
pairs of CS and CS pictures would reoccur throughout the experi-
ment (four pairs of houses, two pairs of male faces, and two pairs of
female faces), the 56 remaining pairs only appeared once, hereafter re-
ferred to as “old” and “new” stimuli, respectively. The electrotactile stim-
ulus (US) consisted of the same sequence of pulses, andwas applied to the
same location, as in Experiment 1. Unlike Experiment 1, however, the
intensity could either be low or high (see below). The instructions would
indicate the intensity of the electrotactile stimulus that potentially could
follow by showing a gray intensity meter that either pointed to the left or
the right, indicating a low or high intensity, respectively (see Fig. 8A).
Procedure.Before entering the scanner, the participants were shown an
example trial of the experiment (without electrotactile stimulation) and
were instructed about the general procedure of the experiment. Specifi-
cally, participants were informed that they would encounter several in-
struction screens where two pictures were presented, one above the
other, on the left side of the screen and an intensitymeter on the right side
of the screen, next to one of the two pictures (see Fig. 8A). It was further
explained to the participants that after these instruction screens, one of
the two pictures would be presented (i.e., CS presentation) in the center
of the screen. If this picture was presented next to the intensity meter
during the instructions, they would receive an electrotactile stimulation
shortly afterward. The intensity of this stimulation was dependent on
which direction the intensity meter pointed to. To ensure that partici-
Braem et al. • Fear Memories in the Human Right Amygdala J. Neurosci., August 23, 2017 • 37(34):8116–8130 • 8119
pants paid attention to the task, one of eight CS presentations (or one of
four in the practice block) were replaced by a catch question where par-
ticipants were shown either one of the two CSs, or a third picture that
they had never seen before (of the same category). On these trials, their
task was to indicate whether this picture was instructed to be followed by
a stimulation, not followed by a stimulation, or never presented before
(all participants performed above chance level on these catch questions;
mean, 87.1%; SD, 10.6%; minimum, 67%; maximum, 100%). Last, on
some trials, participants would also see a centrally presented intensity
meter, which would indicate that an electrotactile stimulus could follow
with a 50% probability. These trials are hereafter referred to as control
trials. Briefly, this last condition was designed to control for general US
expectancy effects during instruction presentation, but is not important
for the current focus of analysis.
Next, participantswere placed on the scanner table and, after attaching
the electrode, the tolerance level was determined for each subject sepa-
rately. The two intensities were determined through a work-up proce-
dure where gradually increasing current amplitudes were presented to
the participant. Participants were asked to determine which amplitude
was the first noticeable, and when we should stop increasing the ampli-
tude, upon which the work-up procedure automatically ended. The first
noticeable current level was used as the low intensity, the last tolerable as
the high intensity. We assured subjects that only those two intensities
could be used in the remainder of the experiment.
After the anatomical scan, we presented the instructions to the partic-
ipant once more. They were further informed that they would receive a
practice block half the length of the following three experimental blocks.
This practice block was to ensure that participants were familiarized with
all the “old” pairs, and was not included in the analyses.
During each block, the participant was presented with an equal num-
ber of all three possible trial types: old instructed trials, new instructed
trials, and control trials. The general structure of each of those trial types
was that they started with 2500 ms instruction presentation, followed by
a 2000–4200 ms instruction–CS interval, a 1000 ms CS presentation,
2000–4200 ms CS–US interval, a 300 ms US presentation (if the CS was
a CS), and, finally, a 2500–4700 ms intertrial interval. For instructed
trials, instruction presentation consisted of a presentation of the CS
and CS picture, one above the other, on the left side of the screen
(location of CS typewas randomly determined per trial), and an intensity
meter next to theCSpicture.On control trials, instruction presentation
consisted of a centrally presented intensity meter. CS presentation on
instructed trials consisted of one of the two CSs (CS or CS) centrally
presented on screen. During control trials, this was replaced by the pre-
sentation of a central fixation cross.
Each test block consisted of 16 new instructed trials, 16 old instructed
trials (each specific pair was presented twice per block), and 16 control
trials. All trial types were further subdivided in eight high-intensity and
eight low-intensity trials. The instructed trial types also showed an equal
number of faces and houses (and an equal number of male and female
pictures among the faces). The different trials were presented in a ran-
dom order.
fMRI data acquisition
In both experiments, participants were positioned head first and supine
and instructed not to move their heads to avoid motion artifacts. Images
were collected using a 3TMagnetom TrioMRI scanner system (Siemens
Medical Systems) with a standard 32-channel radio-frequency head coil.
First, a 3D high-resolution anatomical image of the whole brain was
acquired for coregistration with the functional images using a T1-
weighted 3D MPRAGE sequence (TR  2530 ms; TE  2.58 ms; TI 
1100ms; acquisitionmatrix, 256 256 176; sagittal FOV, 220mm; flip
angle, 7°; voxel size, 0.9  0.86  0.86 mm). Next, whole-brain func-
tional images were collected using a T2*-weighted EPI sequence, sensi-
tive to BOLD contrast (TR 2000ms, TE 28ms, imagematrix 64
64, FOV  224 mm, flip angle  80°, slice thickness  3 mm, distance
factor 17%, voxels resized to 3.0 3.0 3.0 mm, 34 axial slices). The
number of images per run varied depending on response speed during
the rating blocks (Experiment 1) or catch questions (Experiment 2).
Experimental design and statistical analysis
Behavioral data analyses for Experiment 1. We performed two ANOVAs
with the three within-subjects factors phase (training vs test), CS type
(CSP, CSU, andCS), and block (first, second, or third rating block)
for each rating scale separately. Further ANOVAs focused on specific CS
contrasts (e.g., CSP vsCSU) to allow for amore detailed picture of the
significant interactions observed in the main ANOVA. Due to incom-
plete data collection for the first five subjects, we performed all behav-
ioral ANOVAs on 15 subjects. Analyses excluding the factor block
allowed us to study 19 subjects and all 20 subjects for the fear and US
expectancy data (one subject did not have any fear ratings for the CS),
respectively. Including these subjects did not change the significance of
our findings. However, the factor block was, naturally, excluded from
these analyses. Therefore, we only report the overall ANOVA. We did,
however, use these general ratings (across blocks) to investigate brain–
behavior correlations.
Introduction to representational similarity analyses. A traditional mass
univariate voxelwise comparison of CS-related activations in canonical
fMRI analyses can inform about gross differences in the recruitment of
brain regions at the macroscopic scale but is blind to differences in the
recruitment of separable neural ensembles within a brain region. More
recently, multivariate multivoxel pattern analysis techniques have made
possible investigations of intraregional spatial patterns of neuronal acti-
vation (Haxby et al., 2001; Norman et al., 2006; Kriegeskorte et al., 2008),
including in fear conditioning (Li et al., 2008; Bach et al., 2011; Visser et
al., 2011, 2013; Hauner et al., 2013; Dunsmoor et al., 2014), with high
sensitivity, often going beyond conclusions that can be derived from
univariate analyses (notably, the latter did not show any significant dif-
ferences in CSP vs CSU activity during the test phase, neither in a
whole-brain corrected contrast, nor when restricting the analysis to any
of the regions defined below). We therefore investigated similarities and
dissimilarities in neural processing of different CSs or of the same CS at
different time points of the experiment by extracting and comparing
multivoxel activation pattern data from previously selected regions of
interest (ROIs) event-locked to the presentation of the different CSs
(Kriegeskorte et al., 2008).
fMRI data analyses. Data processing and analyses were performed
using the SPM8 Matlab-package software (http://www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/
spm/software/spm8/). The first four volumes of each run in which no
stimulation occurredwere discarded before estimating statisticalmodels.
Anatomical images were spatially normalized to the SPM T1-template
image and resliced to a voxel size of 1 1 1mm. Functional data were
slice-time corrected and spatially realigned to the first volume of the task.
Next, EPIs were spatially normalized based on the T1-derived normal-
ization parameters and a temporal high-pass filter of 128 s was applied to
remove low-frequency drifts. No spatial smoothing was used.
In Experiment 1, BOLD responses were modeled with boxcar func-
tions at CS onset till CS offset (8 s) or with  functions for all other
regressors, which were then convolved with a standard hemodynamic
response function. Event-related regressors were created corresponding
to the onset of the CS and defined by CS type (CS, CSP, or CSU),
corresponding to the onset of US and defined by US type (electrotactile
stimulation or placeholder), or corresponding to the onset of a ratings
question. Specifically, the model included three (or more; see below)
regressors denoting the CS type, one for the ratings, two for the US type
(in the training phase only), and six movement parameters derived from
the realignment procedure, for the two runs separately (which corre-
sponded with the training and test phase, respectively). The statistical
parameter estimates were computed separately for each voxel for all col-
umns in the design matrix. Three different first-level models were fitted.
The CS-type regressors per phase were either further split up in a single
regressor for each trial separately (i.e., the trial-basedmodel), in a regres-
sor for each miniblock separately (i.e., the miniblock model), or in a
regressor per phase (i.e., the phase model). We analyzed the resulting
data by computing pairwise Pearson correlations between all CS event-
related spatial patterns of activation. For a visual depiction of the result-
ing similarity matrices from these three types of models in the anterior
cingulate cortex (ACC), see Figure 2. The strength of these correlations
was used as ametric of similarity. The correlations were Fisher-transformed
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for statistical analyses. Different types of correlations were selected for
the analyses of interest and analyzed in ANOVAs using Statistical Pack-
age for the Social Sciences (version 22, SPSS). Each analysis started with
an overall ANOVA, including the factor region, whose six levels corre-
sponded to the six ROIs identified below. Only when effects interacted
with the factor region were the effects further studied for each region
separately. All reported p values are two-sided and aGreenhouse–Geisser
correction was applied whenever the assumption of sphericity was vio-
lated, but uncorrected degrees of freedom are reported for ease of
reading.
Task events in Experiment 2 were similarly modeled as in Experiment
1, only now we also added separate regressors for instruction presenta-
tions (also modeled with boxcar functions from instruction onset till
instruction offset, 2500 ms). In total, 31 event-related regressors were
created. Eight regressors corresponded to the onset of instruction pre-
sentation and were defined by instruction type (coding for either old vs
new instructions, house vs face stimuli, and low vs high US intensity), 16
corresponded to the onset of CS presentation defined by CS-type (simi-
larly determined by the same conditions as instruction type and further
coding for being a CS or CS presentation), four corresponded to the
onset of control instructions and the subsequent fixation cross presenta-
tion (further determined by low or high intensity), two corresponded to
the onset of US presentations and were defined by being either of low or
high intensity, and, finally, one corresponded to the onset of catch ques-
tions. Although instruction presentations, US presentations, and catch
trials were modeled separately, they were not included in our contrasts
and were considered regressors of noninterest. For the analysis of this
dataset, we only focused on high-intensity trials, where the CS was
instructed and expected to be followed by a high-intensity electrical stim-
ulation. Specifically, we focused on voxel patterns evoked by CS presen-
tation in any of the six ROIs defined below. We again analyzed the
resulting data by computing Fisher-transformed pairwise Pearson corre-
lations. We were especially interested in the correlations between house
and face presentations of the same trial type (see Fig. 8B). This way, we
created four possible correlations of interest: the correlations between
multivoxel patterns of activity to face presentation versus house presen-
tation for CSold trials, CSold trials, CSnew trials, and CSnew
trials, separately. These values were interpreted as the degree to which a
Figure 2. An example of the different types of similaritymatrices in the anterior cingulate cortex (Experiment 1).A–C, The similaritymatrices represent color-coded average Pearson correlation
coefficients across subjects for every possible correlation between all different CS-presentation regressors in the trial-based model (A), miniblock model (B), or phase model (C). The vertical bars
adjacent to each matrix indicate its color coding depending on the correlation coefficient.
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certain region showed a response independent of visual category. Next,
these values were analyzed using two-by-two ANCOVAs with the factors
fear relevance (CS vs CS) and novelty (old vs new), and, to control for
differences in preferred US intensity, the standardized covariate US in-
tensity (baseline-corrected by dividing the high-intensity value by the
low-intensity value), for each ROI separately.
ROI analyses. We extracted  estimates from the separate voxels of
anatomically defined ROIs, known to be relevant in fear conditioning
(the same fear-related regions as were used by Visser et al., 2013). Spe-
cifically, in addition to the amygdala, we focused on the ACC, the supe-
rior frontal gyrus, the insula, and the ventromedial prefrontal cortex,
areas previously implicated in fear conditioning (Mechias et al., 2010;
Visser et al., 2013; Fullana et al., 2015). We extracted the mean voxel
activation from those regions, as obtained from the Harvard–Oxford
cortical and subcortical structural atlases (Harvard Center for Morpho-
metric Analysis), thresholded at 25%, and included a factor “region” in
each of our analyses to identify potential between-region differences.
Results
Experiment 1: rating data
In the rating data, by analyzing the mean fear and US expectancy
ratings per phase and block, we tested whether we could replicate
the behavioral results reported by Raes and colleagues (2014) and
by Mertens and colleagues (2016). There was a clear main effect
of CS type for both ratings (both p’s  0.001), which interacted
with phase (both p’s  0.001; Fig. 1B,C). Marginal significant
three-way interactions between phase, CS type, and block for
both the fear (F(4,11) 3.4, p 0.050) and US expectancy ratings
(F(4,11) 2.7, p 0.088) hinted at a differential evolution of CS
ratings over time, depending on the phase.
Next, by running separate block CS-type ANOVAs, we in-
vestigated these interactions for each CS-type comparison and
phase separately. In the training phase, both theCSP andCSU
elicited a higher US expectancy and fear rating, relative to the
CS (all p’s 0.001).Moreover, the CSP elicited higher ratings
on both scales relative to the CSU (both p’s  0.005). In the
testing phase, again both the CSP and CSU elicited higher
ratings relative to the CS (all p’s 0.001). The CSP, however,
was no longer significantly different from the CSU on both the
fear (F(1,14)  1.3, p  0.272) and the US expectancy (F(1,14) 
1.2, p 0.277) scale, suggesting similar fear responses.
For all CS to CS comparisons, on both phases, there was a
significant interaction between CS type and block (all p’s 
0.001), suggesting that CS ratings did, while CS ratings did
not, decay over time, regardless of the phase (Fig. 1B,C). Inter-
estingly, however, similar interactions betweenCS type and block
between CSP and CSU were absent in the training phase
(F’s  1.7, p’s  0.21) but present in the testing phase, with a
significant interaction for the fear ratings (F(2,13)  12.0, p 
0.001) and a marginally significant interaction in the US expec-
tancy data (F(2,13) 1.2, p 0.052). These interactions demon-
strated that while there was no overall difference between both
CS ratings in the test phase, there were some initial differences
in the first miniblocks of the test phase (Fig. 1B,C). Specifically,
the fear rating for CSP relative toCSUwas significantly higher
in the first block (t(14) 2.22, p 0.044), marginally significant
in the second block (t(14)  1.87, p  0.082), and absent in the
third block (t(14) 0.76, p 0.458). TheUS expectancy rating for
CSP relative to CSU was marginal significantly higher in the
first block (t(14) 1.79, p 0.095), but not significantly different
in the second or third block (t(14) 1.08, p 0.301; t(14) 0.52,
p 0.610, respectively).
In sum, these results clearly replicate the results by Raes and
colleagues (2014) and Mertens and colleagues (2016). Most im-
portantly, the CSP elicited slightly but reliably higher fear rat-
ings than the CSU, especially at the beginning of the test phase
(Fig. 1; Raes et al., 2014; for similar findings in fear-potentiated
startle responses, but not skin conductance responses, see
Mertens et al., 2016). This indicates a dissociable contribution of
prior actual CS–US pairings to the fear reaction to the CSP in
the testing phase.
Similarity analyses: Experiment 1
Different pattern similarity analyses are reported to allow for a
comprehensive picture of the data. Importantly, each of those
analyses were motivated by specific hypotheses, which are de-
tailed below when discussing each analysis separately. We will
first discuss an analysis that tested whether the responses to the
different CSs were similar within the training and test phases.
That is, did the ROIs respondmore similarly to the CSP and the
CSU, than, for example, the CSP and the CS? Thereafter, we
report an analysis that looked at the internal consistency of the
separate patterns to each CS within a phase. Namely, did certain
regions respond in a more consistent manner to one CS as op-
posed to another CS? Third, and most importantly, we tested
whether the pattern response to CSP during the training phase
was a better predictor of itself during the test phase than it was to
CSUorCS. As a post hoc analysis following up on this hypoth-
esized result, we also tested whether regions that show this differ-
ential processing of the CSP also show a relation with the
difference in fear ratings. That is, we wanted to explore whether
the difference in subjective fear experience as observed in the
present study (Raes et al., 2014; replicating previous findings by
Mertens et al., 2016) can be linked back to a neural trace of
experience-based fear. Last, we will report a targeted pattern-
informed connectivity analyses by investigating parallels in trial-
to-trial pattern similarities between the ACC and the left and
right amygdala, depending on CS type, as well as a broader con-
nectivity analysis involving all six regions. Note that every analy-
sis started with an omnibus ANOVA that included the factor
region to detect between-region differences.
Inter-CS similarities per phase
We first confirmed that the selected ROIs process learned stimu-
lus qualities (rather than merely processing the perceptual prop-
erties of the CSs). Specifically, we observed that the trial-averaged
multivoxel activation patterns evoked by the CSP and the
CSU were more similar to each other (CSPCSU inter-CS
similarity; Fig. 3, green bars) than each of them was to the trial-
averaged patterns evoked by the CS (comparison with CSCSP
inter-CS similarity: F(1,19)  11.08, p  0.004; Fig. 3, blue bars;
with CSCSU inter-CS similarity: F(1,19)  18.59, p  0.001;
Fig. 3, red bars; for statistical procedures, seeMaterials andMeth-
ods). This was the case during both training and test (effects of
phase: both F’s 1), but, intriguingly, the effect differed signifi-
cantly between regions (both p’s 0.004). Specifically, in the left
and right amygdalae, the CSP, which is the only CS whose ac-
quired qualities result (in part) from experience, evoked activa-
tion patterns that were not more similar to CSU patterns than
to CS patterns (both F’s 1). This analysis suggests that while
participants were instructed to treat the CSP and CSU simi-
larly (and most fear-related regions also seem to reflect this), the
amygdala could be sensitive towhether the fear value results from
experience, and therefore did respond to them differently. This
difference in respondingwas even comparable to the difference in
responding toCSP versus CS.While we cannot prove that this
effect is not a floor effect, we note that the other analyses below
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show reliable differences in the amygdala (sometimes even exclu-
sively in the amygdala), speaking against the idea that activity in
the amygdala regions was simply too variable or too noisy to
detect reliable differences.
Intra-CS similarities per phase
Areas responsible for processing acquired as opposed to mere
perceptual stimulus qualities are thought to exhibit more consis-
tent activation patterns to each of the CSs than to the CS from
one trial to the next of the experiment (Visser et al., 2011, 2013).
However, note that one could also expect the opposite. Namely,
regions responsive to dynamic trial-to-trial changes in a certain
condition might show a lesser internal consistency. Therefore,
these analyses only allow us to conclude that regions that show
differences in these internal consistency measures between con-
ditions must respond to these two conditions differently. Such a
result would be another confirmation that such regions encode
acquired stimulus qualities. For simplicity and robustness, we
grouped trials into three miniblocks per phase and computed
intra-CS similarities fromoneminiblock to the next. As expected,
intra-CSP similarity was significantly greater than intra-CS
similarity (main effect of CS type: F(1,19) 18.11, p 0.001; Fig.
4), and this difference decreased in the test phase relative to the
training phase, which is consistent with the observed extinction
in fear ratings in this phase (F(1,19) 4.49, p 0.047; no interac-
tions with region, F(5,95)’s 1.95, p’s 0.135). In stark contrast,
the intra-CSU versus intra-CS similarity analysis (main effect
of CS type: F(1,19)  7.31, p  0.014) exhibited an interaction
effect with region (F(5,95) 2.82, p 0.020; but no interactions
with phase, F’s  1). The amygdalae were the only ROIs not
showing significantly higher intra-CSU than intra-CS simi-
larities (both F(1,19)’s  1.25, p’s  0.278). That is, an analysis
based on the temporal consistence of neural activation patterns
(Visser et al., 2011, 2013) found no evidence that the amygdala
processes the learned qualities of a merely instructed stimulus,
the CSU.
Although all our analyses reflect between-region differences
in different forms of fear processing between six identified fear-
related ROIs, one could also investigate whether completely un-
related ROIs show a fear response. Although it is hard to select
completely unrelated regions, we investigated whether the supe-
rior temporal gyrus (i.e., auditory cortex) shows a similar main
effect of fear conditioning (as suggested by an independent
reader). Specifically, we zoomed in on the most reliable effect
across all cortical fear-related regions: the enhanced correlation
between patterns of responses to the instructed and experienced
stimulus (CSP) versus the neutral stimulus (CS). While this
effect did reach significance in each of those regions, even after
correcting formultiple comparisons, it did not reach significance
in the superior temporal gyrus (F(1,19) 2.52, p 0.129).
Inter-CS similarities across phase
Both the CSP and the CSU, but not the CS, carry a repre-
sentation of threat. Fear-related regions should therefore show
CS-evoked activation patterns that are more similar to each
other than to CS-evoked activation patterns. Intriguingly, the
Figure3. Inter-CS similarities per region and experimental phase (Experiment 1), based on theminiblockmodel (Fig. 2).A–D,More similarmultivoxel activation patterns between the twoCSs
than between a CS and the CS indicate processing of learned stimulus value in the ACC (A), superior frontal gyrus (B; SFG), insula (C), and ventromedial prefrontal cortex (D; vmPFC). E, F, The
amygdala does not exhibit greater similarity between the instructed and experienced CS (CSP) and the merely instructed CS (CSU) relative to the similarity between these CSs and the
CS. The error bars are1 SEM.
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above set of similarity analyses indicated that the amygdala’s neu-
ral activation pattern to the CSP was not more similar to the
CSU than it was to CS, whereas all other fear-related regions
did show a greater similarity between their responses to CSP and
CSU than between any of the two CSs and the CS (Fig. 3).
Moreover, while all fear-related regions, including the amygdala,
showed a higher consistency (within phase, but across miniblocks)
in their neural pattern response to the CSP than the CS, only the
nonamygdala fear-related regions also showed a higher consistency
in their response to theCSUthan theCS (Fig. 4). Together, these
results arealready suggestiveof the idea that theamygdala is involved
differently in the processing of an instructed and experienced versus
a merely instructed fear contingency.
However, the central question in our analyses was whether
brain regions involved in fear learning would respond differently
to both CSs in the test phase, despite the fact that the same
verbal information was given about both CSs. A neural trace of
experience-based Pavlovian fear learning should be apparent
from similarities between CS-evoked activation patterns during
test and the activation pattern evoked by the CSP during train-
ing (CSPtr), i.e., where the contingency was experienced and
the Pavlovian fear memory was formed. Specifically, one should
expect higher similarities between CSPtr patterns and the pat-
terns evoked by the sameCSduring testing (i.e., CSPte). If those
similarities were larger than between CSPtr and CSUte (as
well as between CSPtr and CSte), they would indicate a Pav-
lovian memory trace. By contrast, if CSPtrCSPte similarities
were nomore pronounced than CSPtrCSUte similarities, this
would indicate a more generalized representation of threat dur-
ing testing that does not retain a specific experience-based mem-
ory element. In this critical analysis, we observed a significantly
higher similarity between CSPtr and CSPte (CSPtrCSPte)
as well as CSPtr and CSUte (CSPtrCSUte), than between
CSPtr and CSte (CSPtrCSPte vs CSPtrCSte similarity:
F(1,19) 19.36, p 0.001; CS
PtrCSUte vs CSPtrCSte sim-
ilarity: F(1,19)  14.27, p  0.001; Figure 5). Importantly,
CSPtrCSPte did not differ from CSPtrCSUte pattern sim-
ilarity (F(1,19)  0.397, p  0.536). These results suggest both
CSs evoked similar threat-related processing during test. How-
ever, there was an interaction with region (F(10,190)  3.32, p 
0.007; also when comparing the left and right amygdala only:
F(2,18) 3.31, p 0.047). Namely, the right amygdala exhibited
CSPte patterns that were significantly more similar to CSPtr
patterns thanwere bothCSUte andCSte patterns (CSPtrCSPte
vs CSPtrCSUte similarity: t(19)  2.204, p  0.040;
CSPtrCSPte vs CSPtrCSte similarity: t(19)  3.990, p 
0.001; Fig. 5F). The CSUte and CSte patterns did not differ in
their similarity to the CSPtr pattern (t(19) 1.013, p 0.324).
Importantly, in all other regions, the patterns of CSPte and
CSUte were not significantly different in their similarity to the
pattern of CSPtr (all t(19)’s  1. Hence, this analysis isolated a
threat-related neural response during testing in the right
amygdala that was exclusively evoked by the CSP, as opposed to
the CSU, meeting our criterion for a Pavlovian trace of actually
experiencedCS–US pairings. Other regions appeared to register a
merely instructed threat (CSU) in the same way as a threat that
is not only instructed but also previously experienced (CSP).
The observation that activation in the right amygdala is more
similar for CSPtr and CSPte than for CSPtr and CSUte
might also reflect the fact that CSPtr and CSPte are visually
Figure 4. A–F, Intra-CS similarities fromminiblock tominiblock per CS type, region, and experimental phase (Experiment 1), based on theminiblockmodel (Fig. 2). Higher temporal consistency
in intra-CS than intra-CS similarities indicatesprocessingof learned stimulusqualities in agivenROI. This is not observed for themerely instructedCS (CSU) in theamygdalae (E,F ). Theerror
bars are1 SEM.
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more similar than CSPtr and CSUte. However, if this alterna-
tive explanation is correct, then activation for CSUtr and
CSUte should also be more similar than activation for CSUtr
and CSPte. No such difference was observed (t(16) 0.727, p
0.476). In fact, the similarity between CSPtr and CSPte was
higher than that between the CSUtr and CSUte (t(19) 3.502,
p 0.002).
Further supporting the encoding of this Pavlovian fear trace in
the right amygdala, we observed a relation between CSP-
specific right amygdala neural responses and the observed differ-
ential (CSP  CSU) fear response, in that the difference
betweenCSPtrCSPte andCSPtrCSUte pattern similarities
as depicted in Figure 5F predicted the difference in CSPte and
CSUte fear ratings during test across participants (Spearman’s
  0.465, p  0.039; Fig. 5G). This post hoc analysis should of
course be treated with caution because our study (and its sample
size) was not in the first instance set up to study intersubject
correlations.
Inter-region similarities in Intra-CS similarities
If the right amygdala processes experience-based threat in a way
that can be dissociated from its processing of instruction-based
threat, it might also preferentially exchange that information
with other threat areas. Specifically, we wondered, for compari-
son, whether CSP-related functional connectivity of the right
amygdala with the ACC would differ from that of the left
amygdala. The ACC is the region most prominently and consis-
tently activated during fear-conditioning studies (Mechias et al.,
2010; Fullana et al., 2015) and also exhibits strong structural and
functional connectivity with the amygdalae (Etkin et al., 2006;
Williams et al., 2006; Bissie`re et al., 2008; van Marle et al., 2010;
for review, see Kim et al., 2011; Carlson et al., 2013). To this end,
we opted to carry out voxel-pattern-informed connectivity anal-
yses, which have recently been demonstrated to bemore sensitive
and reliable than standard connectivity analysis (Geerligs et al.,
2016). To perform a similarity-based functional connectivity
analysis, we used the trial-based model (Fig. 2A) and, separately
for each subject, Spearman correlated the trial-by-trial intra-CS
similarities per CS and phase (Fig. 6A) between regions, thereby
indexing among these three regions similarities in how a CS pat-
tern relates to itself across time (Fig. 6B,C; Kriegeskorte et al.,
2008). We found that intra-CSP relative to intra-CSU simi-
larity time courses from the right amygdala, but not the left
amygdala, showed a higher correlation with corresponding ACC
time courses (interaction between CS type and amygdala side:
F(1,19)  5.68, p  0.028; follow-up comparison of correlations
between intra-CSP and intra-CSU similarity time courses
from the right amygdala and ACC: t(19) 2.698, p 0.014; from
the left amygdala and ACC: t(19) 0.767, p 0.453; Fig. 6B,C).
These results further corroborate the conclusion that the right
amygdala reacts differently to experienced and instructed fear,
but also point toward an extended role of a larger network (Pes-
soa and Adolphs, 2010; Okon-Singer et al., 2015) by showing an
Figure 5. A–F, Comparison of inter-CS similarities between each of the three different CS types from the test phase (CSte, CSPte, CSUte) and the CSP pattern from the training phase
(CSPtr), based on the phasemodel (Fig. 2), reveals CSP-specific processing of threat-related information in the right amygdala (Experiment 1): CSP-associatedmultivoxel activation patterns
during test (CSPte) are more similar to CSP-associated patterns during training (CSPtr) than CSU-associated patterns during test (CSUte; F ); other regions do not show such differenti-
ation (A–E). The error bars are1 SEM. G, Individual differences in the difference between CSPtrCSPte and CSPtrCSUte inter-CS similarities in the right amygdala were correlated with
differences in fear ratings between CSP and CSU in the test phase.
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increased functional connectivity with the ACC for communicat-
ing this experience-based component of fear learning.
To further illustrate this idea, and allow for a more compre-
hensive picture of the data, we also computed, for each CS-type
separately, inter-region similarity matrices depicting each possi-
ble region-to-region connectivity (Fig. 7A). As a point of refer-
ence, we further included twooccipital regions, namely the lateral
occipital cortex and occipital pole. Multidimensional scaling
analyses on Figure 7C depict the relations between the six fear-
related regions for both CSs in the test phase. We used two-
dimensional solutions (PROXSCAL, SPSS), as these offered the
most optimal stress levels relative to the number of dimensions
(i.e., the elbow in the scree plot). Most importantly, these analy-
ses visualize how the connectivity patterns change depending on
the CS-type processing. For example, Figure 7C suggests a more
integrated role for the right amygdala when it comes to process-
ing the CSP. In fact, when comparing the overall connectivity
between all six fear-related regions per CS (averaging all 15 pos-
sible connections; Fig. 7B), it appeared to be enhanced for
CSPte relative to CSUte (t(19)  2.633, p  0.016). When
testing this for each region separately (its average connectivity
with all other five regions for CSPte relative to CSUte), the
only two regions showing significantly stronger connectivity dur-
ing CSPte processing were the right amygdala and the ACC
(t(19) 2.780, p 0.012; t(19) 2.541, p 0.020, respectively; all
other regions, t(19) 1.91, p 0.071), again suggesting that these
two regions and their interaction play an important role in the
learning or expressing of experience-based fear.
Similarity analyses: Experiment 2
In the second experiment, we used a different, but conceptually
similar procedure to investigate whether we could replicate the
observation that the right amygdala (compared with the left
amygdala) dissociated between instructed and experienced (i.e.,
old) versus merely instructed (i.e., new) fear contingencies.
Moreover, this experiment used stimuli belonging to different
visual categories (houses vs faces) across different trials of the
same condition, allowing us to study the similarity between pat-
tern responses to the presentation of a house versus a face as a CS.
The results, shown in Figure 8, hinted at a main effect of fear
relevance (CS vs CS, F(1,17) 4.00, p 0.062), suggesting that
object category independence (i.e., house–face pattern similarity)
indexed activation of a threat representation. More importantly,
there was a three-way interaction between CS type, CS novelty,
and amygdala side (F(1,17)  5.38, p  0.033) that was qualified
by a two-way interaction betweenCS type and novelty in the right
amygdala (F(1,17)  5.36, p  0.033), but not the left amygdala
(F(1,17) 0.133, p 0.720).More specifically, the right amygdala
again differentiated between the processing of novel (i.e., merely
instructed) and old (i.e., previously instructed and experienced)
fear contingencies (Fig. 8C–H). Namely, the similarity between
faces and houses was higher for CSold than CSold (t(18) 
2.653, p  0.016), but not for CSnew than CSnew (t(18) 
0.217, p 0.831). This result further supports our conclusion
that the right amygdala carries a trace of the CS–US contingency
experience made during Pavlovian fear conditioning. No other
fear-related regions (Fig. 8) showed a similar CS type by novelty
interaction (allF’s 1.782, p’s 0.200), again suggesting that the
right amygdala was most sensitive in encoding a Pavlovian trace.
Discussion
Demonstrating a purely experience-based element in human
Pavlovian fear conditioning and identifying its neural correlates
has been a major goal of learning research over recent decades.
While the strong phenomenological and functional homolo-
gies between human and nonhuman fear conditioning have
always suggested language-independent processing in humans,
previous efforts have not yielded conclusive evidence. Our new
Figure 6. Inter-region similarity analyses between the ACC and left and right amygdalae (Experiment 1). A, Trial-by-trial intra-CS similaritymatrices from the trial-basedmodels for each region
andCS type.On this basis, Spearmancorrelation coefficientswere calculatedbetweeneach combinationof the resulting trial-by-trial ACCand left and right amygdala intra-CS similarity time courses,
separately for each CS.B, C, The right amygdala showed a higher inter-region similarity with the ACC for the CSP specifically (B), relative to the left amygdala, where no such effect was observed
(C). The error bars are1 SEM.
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approach is not dependent on controversial methods to exclude
verbal or conscious processing (Mitchell et al., 2009) and exploits
recent advances in the multivariate analysis of neural signatures
of fear learning and memory (Li et al., 2008; Bach et al., 2011;
Visser et al., 2011, 2013; Hauner et al., 2013; Dunsmoor et al.,
2014). Becauseof theseunique features,weare able toprovidemuch
sought evidence for experience-based threat processing. Specifically,
usingpattern similarity analyses,our twoexperimentsdemonstrated
that the right amygdala was the only fear-related region whose
neural activation pattern to experienced CSs was different from
its neural pattern tomerely instructedCSs.Of course, our data do
not imply that the right amygdala does not process instructed
threat information. Rather, it appears to respond in a uniqueway,
perhaps in the form of specialized neural ensembles, to experience-
based threat information. More generally, the amygdala has also
been implicated in other processes in addition to fear processing
(Pessoa and Adolphs, 2010; Okon-Singer et al., 2015). Therefore,
future studies should determine whether other separable expe-
rience-dependent neural traces in the right amygdala can be identi-
fied for other forms of learning as well.
The present findings seem to converge with those of previous
fear-conditioning studies that were set up to single out uncon-
scious fear conditioning. However, as noted above, the present
study was not designed to study unconscious or implicit fear
conditioning. Instead, the manipulations in the present study
weremade very explicit: participants were verymuchmade aware
of the instructions and the actual CS–US pairings. This way, our
study tried to create conditions for instructed fear learning to
override a hypothesized experience-based component to fear
learning. Our results show that these instructions were successful
in evoking a similar neural response to the merely instructed
compared with the instructed and experienced stimulus in most
fear-related regions, except in the right amygdala. It is possible
that the present experience-based trace in the right amygdala
is related to the one identified in previous unconscious fear-
conditioning studies. However, the present study cannot (and
did not aim to) prove the hypothesized unconscious nature of
this experience-based trace (Ohman and Mineka, 2001). There-
fore, it does not distinguish between an experience-based mem-
ory trace that is generated fully automatically and unconsciously
versus one that relies on conscious contingency knowledge.
The present observation of apparent hemispheric differences
in threat processing in the amygdala also adds to another impor-
tant and more specific question in fear research, that concerning
Figure 7. Inter-region similarity analyses per different CS type and experimental phase. A, Correlations were calculated between each combination of two regions’ intra-CS similarity matrices
from the trial-basedmodels (Fig. 2), per CS and phase separately, as explained in Figure 6.B, The correlations across all fear-related regions were averaged and are presented per CS type and phase
separately. C, Visual two-dimensional scaling depiction of the similarities between different regions for each CS in the test phase separately.
Braem et al. • Fear Memories in the Human Right Amygdala J. Neurosci., August 23, 2017 • 37(34):8116–8130 • 8127
Figure 8. Procedure Experiment 2 and results. A, Each trial consisted of a fear-contingency instruction and a CS presentation. The instruction indicated which of two pictures (CS) would be
followed by an electrical US by presenting an intensity meter next to that picture. A, lower left, Some CSs and instructions were recurring (old); others were always novel (new). Orthogonal to this,
some instructions and subsequent CS presentations used pictures of houses, others of faces. CS presentationwas always followed by a US presentation. On a small subset of trials, CS presentation
was replaced by a catch question, to make certain that participants paid attention to the experiment. B, The similarity analyses focused exclusively on pattern similarities between face and house
pictures during CS presentations, for each CS type separately (CSold, CSold, CSnew, and CSnew). C–H, These analyses revealed that the right, but not the left, amygdala showed a
differential response to fear relevance as a function of novelty. Namely, the pattern response for houses and faces were more similar when these denoted a CS than when they indicated a CS.
However, this difference was only present when the CSs had been instructed and experienced before (old CSs), but disappeared when they were novel. The error bars are1 SEM.
8128 • J. Neurosci., August 23, 2017 • 37(34):8116–8130 Braem et al. • Fear Memories in the Human Right Amygdala
the presence of amygdala lateralization (Baker and Kim, 2004;
Sergerie et al., 2008). Our results clearly suggest that the right
amygdala shows a separable neural response to actual CS–US pair-
ings,whereas the left amygdala appears tobemore susceptible to fear
instructions. These findings agree with those from previous (lesion)
studies suggesting that the right amygdala is associated with a fear
response to experiencing negative events, while the left amygdala is
more responsive to theverballymediatedcognitive representationof
fear (Funayama et al., 2001; Phelps et al., 2001).
Last, our findings also fit well with those of another recent
study by Atlas and colleagues (2016). In this study, Atlas and
colleagues used two CSs that were both predictive of the US, but
in different phases of the experiment. Crucially, they contrasted a
condition in which this reversal in contingencies was always in-
structed to a condition where it was not, and observed that the
amygdala was more responsive to the actual (changes in) contin-
gencies rather than the instructions that preceded those. Interest-
ingly, their analyses did not show a hemispheric difference, in
contrast to earlier findings suggesting that the left amygdala can
be responsive to instructions (present results; Funayama et al.,
2001; Phelps et al., 2001). However, as also argued in their dis-
cussion, Atlas and colleagues (2016) focused on the effects of
instruction in changing environments and examined dynamic
learning-related responses, whereas our study used a manipula-
tion where the contingencies did not change, and instructions
were given full opportunity to override the hypothesized Pavlov-
ian trace.
In sum, across two experiments, we investigated neural pat-
tern responses in fear-related regions to experience-based fear
processing in the face of verbal fear instructions.Our results show
that verbal instructions were successful in evoking a similar neural
response in fear-related regions to merely instructed versus in-
structed and experienced fear stimuli, except for the right amygdala.
Instead, the human right amygdala showed a Pavlovian trace, sug-
gesting it to be more sensitive to the actual experience of CS–US
contingencies.
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